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CONTENTS
PRAXIS
RES JUDICATA
THE RIGHT TO STRIKE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
ADVISORY OPINION ON CONVENTION NO. 87 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ILO SYSTEM
The article examines the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 May 2026 on the right to strike in the context of ILO Convention No.87. The Opinion is analysed not only as a decision on the interpretation of one of the ILO’s fundamental conventions, but also as a response to a long-standing institutional conflict within the International Labour Organization concerning the work of its supervisory bodies and the legal content of freedom of association. Particular attention is given to the Court’s procedural Order of 16 November 2023, which allowed international non-governmental organizations enjoying general consultative status with the ILO to participate in the advisory proceedings. The article examines in detail the Court’s reasoning: the application to Convention No.87 of the general rules of treaty interpretation reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; the assessment of the subsequent practice of States parties to the Convention; and the determination of the interpretative value of the pronouncements of the ILO supervisory bodies as a supplementary means of interpretation to which “great weight” may be ascribed. The Advisory Opinion confirms that the right to strike is encompassed in the protection of freedom of association guaranteed by Convention No.87 and constitutes one of the means of collective defence of workers’ interests. At the same time, the Court confined its conclusion to the fact that this right is protected under the Convention, without determining its precise content, scope or conditions of exercise.
IS OIL PRODUCTION PREVAILING?
A REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ JUDGMENT IN GREENPEACE NORDIC AND OTHERS V. NORWAY
This review analyzes the case of Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway, decided by the European Court of Human Rights in October 2025, and examines its significance for human rights standards in the field of international climate law. The central question addressed is the extent to which the European Convention on Human Rights can serve as a tool for limiting state policy on the exploration and extraction of fossil fuels in the context of the climate crisis. The author reviews the factual background of the case, the course of the domestic proceedings before the Norwegian courts, and the arguments advanced by the applicant organizations in Strasbourg, primarily under Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention. The applicants asserted a causal link between licensing decisions for petroleum exploration, subsequent extraction activities, and greenhouse gas emissions — including those occurring outside the respondent State’s territory — and climate-related harm that could ultimately lead to violations of human rights. The analysis of the Court’s judgment demonstrates its dual approach. On the one hand, the Court acknowledged the reality and seriousness of anthropogenic climate change and recognized a sufficiently close link between licensing decisions for fossil fuel exploration and climate harm, building on the reasoning developed in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland. On the other hand, the Court significantly narrowed the scope of its review, focusing primarily on procedural aspects of domestic decision-making and refraining from assessing the substantive climate obligations of the state, including the question of whether the continued extraction of oil and gas is compatible with human rights. The author emphasizes that the Court declined to recognize the existence of a positive obligation on States to leave fossil fuels in the ground or substantially limit their extraction. As a result, no violation of the Convention was found. The article concludes that while the judgment reveals the current limits of the Court’s willingness to intervene in climate disputes involving structural aspects of national energy policy, its strategic significance lies elsewhere — namely, in the consolidation of heightened procedural standards for licensing decisions concerning fossil fuel extraction and, in its potential, in stimulating further developments at the domestic level.
AWARD OF 22 APRIL 2026 IN THE CASE CONCERNING COASTAL STATE RIGHTS IN THE BLACK SEA,SEA OF AZOV, AND KERCH STRAIT
SUMMARY AND COMMENTS
On 22 April 2026, the arbitral tribunal constituted under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea delivered its Award in the Case Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait. The main point of intrigue in this case had already been resolved in 2020, when, in its Award on Preliminary Objections, the Tribunal acknowledged the existence of a dispute concerning sovereignty over Crimea and held that it lacked jurisdiction in that regard, as Article 288 of the Convention empowers it to consider only disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention. Therefore, in its 2026 Award, the Court focused on other issues: the status of the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait, the regime of navigation in these waters, the obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment, and the protection of underwater cultural heritage. The Court’s main conclusion — that these waters constitute internal waters — follows directly from Article 1 of the 2003 bilateral treaty. On the basis of this conclusion, the Court invoked the principle of ne ultra petita and rejected Ukraine’s claims based on the provisions of the 1982 Convention concerning the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone. Most of the Court’s theoretical conclusions draw on the case law of other international courts; consequently, the Judgment is unlikely to represent a milestone in the development of the law of the sea. Nevertheless, the Court made a number of noteworthy observations on secondary issues (the protection of underwater cultural heritage, etc.).
SCRIPTORIUM
LEX MERCATORIA
APPROACHES OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION TRIBUNALS TO THE ISSUE OF MULTIPLE PROCEEDINGS: FROM INDIFFERENCE TO THE RECOGNITION OF ABUSE OF PROCESS
Within the modern system of dispute resolution between foreign investors and host states, the initiation of multiple (or parallel) proceedings by an investor based on the same facts and the same state conduct but under different international investment protection treaties has emerged as a serious problem. The practice of arbitral tribunals regarding the recognition of such multiple proceedings initiated by an investor as an abuse of procedural rights is inconsistent. As analysis of arbitral awards demonstrates, the mere fact that multiple proceedings exist is far from always being recognized by arbitrators as an abuse of process or as grounds for dismissing the investor’s claims. To date, separate proceedings have been permitted not only for each direct claim filed by the company as the direct investor but also for claims brought by controlling and minority shareholders of that company. Such multiplicity of claims leads to a corresponding increase in arbitration costs for the parties, the issuance of conflicting awards, and the risk of multiple compensation for the same state violations. This article acknowledges the ineffectiveness of existing tools for minimizing multiple proceedings, such as anti-suit injunctions, waiver clauses and consolidation clauses. In this regard, the article proposes turning to alternative methods for limiting multiple arbitration proceedings: a more active and expansive application by tribunals of the principles of res judicata and lis pendens, as well as the proven effective principle of the prohibition of abuse of rights (or abuse of process). Moreover, these principles are recognized in legal doctrine and practice as general principles of law within the meaning of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The issue of multiple arbitration proceedings is addressed in several articles of the Draft Provisions on Procedural and Cross-Cutting Issues of UNCITRAL Working Group III on the reform of investor–State dispute settlement. However, the text of those articles does not include the principle of the prohibition of abuse of rights as a tool for resolving this problem.
JUS IN BELLO
THE 1986 JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE CASE CONCERNING MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND AGAINST NICARAGUA (NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA): HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION AND CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) of 27 June 1986. This Judgment is rightly considered one of the most significant in the history of international justice due to its fundamental impact on the development of entire branches of international law: the law of international security and international humanitarian law. The article examines the key doctrinal aspects of the Judgment: first, the elaboration of the fundamental principles of jus ad bellum — the prohibition of the use of force, the principle of non-intervention, and the right to self-defence; second, the novel approach to the identification of rules of customary international law, including the recognition of United Nations General Assembly resolutions as evidence of the opinio juris of states; and third, the formulation of the “effective control” test for the purpose of attributing responsibility to a state for the acts of non-state entities. Particular attention is paid to the debate within the doctrine of international law, where both positive assessments of the Judgment as a “constitutive act” of the modern legal order, as well as sharply critical approaches calling into question the Court’s methodology, coexist. The article demonstrates how the conflict between the effective control test developed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case and the overall control test used in the practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has influenced the understanding of the risks of fragmentation of international law resulting from the proliferation of international courts and tribunals. The author concludes that the legal positions formulated in the 1986 Judgment retain their normative force, notwithstanding the procedural difficulties that arose during the proceedings and the political non-recognition of the Judgment by the United States. These positions continue to serve as a conceptual framework for the resolution of contemporary international disputes, including issues of state responsibility for the acts of non-state armed groups. The ICJ’s Judgment in the Nicaragua case continues to retain its relevance, to stimulate the development of legal thought, and to serve as an indispensable point of reference in the face of the growing fragmentation of the international order.
JUS HOMINUM
RECEPTION OF AFRICAN CONCEPTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION SYSTEM
The article is devoted to the formation and development of the African regional system for the protection of human rights. Its central focus is the question of how African philosophical, ethical, and political-legal ideas were received, reinterpreted, and incorporated into contemporary international legal norms and institutions. It is shown that this system emerged through the interaction of universal human rights standards with the experience of decolonization, Pan-African political thought, and regional conceptions of social responsibility. The key normative element is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981, which established a distinctive model of human rights based on the combination of individual rights, collective peoples’ rights, and the duties of the individual toward society. It is emphasized that this structure reflects not only cultural particularities but also the historical context of struggles for independence, self-determination, and control over natural resources. A significant role in the development of the system belongs to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court, whose jurisprudence has given the Charter’s norms concrete legal content and adapted them to the resolution of real disputes. Particular attention is devoted to the philosophy of ubuntu, which emphasizes human interdependence and the social nature of dignity. The article also examines omolúàbí, ujamaa, and cieng as concepts reflecting moral duty, justice, and communal solidarity. Although not direct sources of law, these concepts influence legal reasoning and the interpretation of norms. A separate section is devoted to restorative justice, which is considered a characteristic feature of the African legal tradition. Using examples of traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution, as well as modern institutions — the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and the gacaca courts in Rwanda — the article demonstrates an orientation toward restoring social ties, reconciling the parties, and compensating for harm caused. An analysis of the jurisprudence of regional and national bodies demonstrates how the principles of collective rights, dignity, and community participation are implemented in specific cases concerning the rights of Indigenous peoples, access to resources, and the protection of human dignity. As a result, the article concludes that the African human rights protection system is not an alternative to universal standards but rather their regional concretization, expanding the content of human rights through consideration of collective interests, historical injustice, and a restorative approach to justice.
INTERIM MEASURES OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES
The article examines the problem of the legal nature and binding force of interim measures adopted by the UN human rights treaty bodies, as well as their place within national legal systems. The methodological basis of the study consists of formal legal, comparative legal, and systemic methods, which make it possible to consider interim measures at both the international and domestic levels. The article analyzes the principal international treaties in the field of human rights protection, their optional protocols, the rules of procedure of UN treaty bodies, their practice, and the positions of executive and judicial authorities of various states. The author considers interim protective measures indicated by UN human rights treaty bodies as an institution of international law that ensures the effectiveness of the procedure for examining individual communications. Based on the identified key features (urgency, temporariness, accessory nature, and unilateral character) and functions (protective and stabilizing), the author substantiates their independent legal nature, which precludes equating them with provisional measures in in civil procedural law. The powers of UN human rights treaty bodies to adopt such measures are, in some cases, expressly provided for in treaties and optional protocols thereto, while in others they are derived from the rules of procedure of UN human rights treaty bodies and the doctrine of implied powers, which has historically given rise to objections from certain states. The article also addresses the issue of the binding legal force of interim measures by comparing the arguments of treaty bodies, which emphasize the obligation of good-faith cooperation, with the positions of states that insist on their recommendatory nature. Despite this, many states comply with interim protective measures in practice. In the Russian legal system, interim measures are not recognized as binding. However, interim measures may be recognized as a conditional ground for deferring, suspending, or terminating the enforcement of a final judicial act, provided that they are subject to judicial assessment and that the balance of constitutional rights is maintained.
JUSTITIA
IN SEARCH OF CLIMATE JUSTICE: THE ROLE AND LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODIES
Climate change is recognized as one of the most serious global threats, necessitating the mobilization the legal resources of the international community. Universal climate treaties — the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement — fail to ensure an adequate level of compliance by States with their obligations. In these circumstances, the role of international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies can play in shaping legal benchmarks for States’ climate action, refining the content of the due diligence obligation, and articulating the standard of adequacy for climate mitigation measures acquires increasing significance. This article focuses on advisory opinions and decisions rendered in recent years. In its 2025 advisory opinion, the ICJ confirmed the existence of universal State obligations to prevent transboundary harm and the binding character of the due diligence standard. In its 2024 advisory opinion, ITLOS recognized GHG emissions as a form of pollution of the marine environment. In its 2025 advisory opinion, the IACtHR formulated for the first time the right to a stable climate. The ECtHR, in the KlimaSeniorinnen case, held that the inadequacy of climate measures may violate Article 8 of the ECHR. The practice of UN treaty bodies is also examined, which allows for developing approaches to the extraterritorial responsibility of States for the transboundary effects of GHG emissions and reveals the recognition of the systemic nexus between the climate crisis and violations of fundamental human rights. The analysis demonstrates that, notwithstanding differences in the scope of jurisdiction and the legal force of the acts adopted, international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies are progressively forming a complementary body of legal reasoning grounded in the concept of climate justice. They not only contribute to the elaboration and concretization of principles previously belonging predominantly to the realm of “soft law” but also create the prerequisites for their progressive normative crystallization at the universal level. At the same time, the article adopts a more restrained assessment of their potential: judicial mechanisms do not substitute for the treaty-making process, yet they constitute an essential element of the emerging climate justice regime, guiding its evolution and delineating the limits of State discretion.
JUS COMMUNE
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN PROTECTING CLIMATE REFUGEES: LEGAL ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE CHALLENGES
This paper examines the extent to which European Union law is capable of protecting persons displaced by climate factors, given the 2024 reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and the absence of a separate category of “climate refugee” therein. The methodological basis consists of a formal legal and comparative legal analysis of EU acts, as well as an analysis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee, and the national courts of Austria, Italy, and Germany. The article systematically addresses several interrelated questions: the limitations of the 1951 Refugee Convention in relation to climate-induced displacement; the normative potential of the 2024 CEAS reform — in particular, the mechanisms of subsidiary protection, vulnerability assessment, and interstate solidarity under Regulation (EU) 2024/1347, Regulation (EU) 2024/1351, and Directive (EU) 2024/1346; the relevant case law of the ECtHR in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland and of the UN Human Rights Committee in Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand; comparative experience from Latin America, the African Union, and the Pacific region; and the concept of climate justice in light of the 2025 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligations of states in respect of climate change. It is shown that the updated rules on subsidiary protection and vulnerability assessment allow climate risks to be considered through existing legal constructs — in particular, the concept of “serious harm” under Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 and the prohibition of inhuman treatment under Article 19 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights — but their application remains fragmentary. A gap has been identified between the normative potential of the reform and the administrative practice of EU member states: competent authorities rarely highlight climate factors in the reasoning of their decisions, while courts more often integrate environmental circumstances into their risk assessments. Based on doctrinal approaches, a typology of four groups of persons in need of differentiated protection instruments has been proposed: citizens of disappearing coastal states facing the loss of territory due to rising sea levels; inhabitants of arid and semi-arid agricultural regions confronted with land degradation and prolonged droughts; victims of sudden natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, and mudslides; and persons residing in areas of multiple vulnerability where climate factors intersect with armed conflict, political instability, and institutional fragility. The need for special criteria for evaluating evidence — including differentiated standards of proof, thorough internal displacement assessments, and vulnerability screenings — is substantiated as essential for increasing the predictability and consistency of protection practice across EU member states.