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CONTENTS
PRAXIS
RES JUDICATA
CLIMATE OBLIGATIONS OF STATES: THE 2025 ADVISORY OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
This article presents a comprehensive scholarly and legal analysis of the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion, which defines the international legal obligations of states in connection with climate change. The author identifies the content, structure, and legal nature of states’ climate obligations, as well as the significance of the advisory opinion for the development of international law. Based on an analysis of the advisory opinion’s text, the author demonstrates that the Court, for the first time, systematically interpreted three key international treaties—the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement—emphasizing their complementarity and the absence of legal contradictions between them. The article pays particular attention to states’ obligations to prepare nationally determined contributions (NDCs) in accordance with the Paris Agreement. The Court recognized this as a legally binding act, noting that this obligation includes elements of both a commitment of result and conduct, implemented in compliance with a high standard of due diligence and the principle of “the highest possible ambition”. The author explores the relationship between climate change obligations and customary international law, highlighting such customs as the duty to prevent significant transboundary environmental harm and the duty to cooperate. The article devotes particular attention to the analysis of climate change obligations arising from the treaties of such areas of international law as international human rights law and the international law of the sea. The article also analyzes issues of international state responsibility, including the recognition of obligations to combat climate change as obligations erga omnes and the possibility of compensation for breach of obligations. Ultimately, the author concludes that the 2025 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice forms the conceptual and normative basis for the further development of the global regime of international legal protection of climate change.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DISPUTE ANGEL SAMUEL SEDA AND OTHERS V. COLOMBIA
National security exceptions have been repeatedly used by respondent states in recent years in the field of international trade law, primarily in the dispute settlement practice within the World Trade Organization. One of the central issues in dispute settlement, if respondent has invoked a national security exception, is determining whether the panel has jurisdiction to hear the dispute or whether the decision on the measure in question is entirely within the discretion of the respondent. In the field of international investment law, security exceptions are also included in international agreements and sometimes used in disputes, and more arbitral awards in which such exceptions were, to one degree or another, the subject of consideration, become public. This article proposes a study and classification of the national security exceptions that have been included in international investment agreements. As can be seen from the examples given in this article, many of them are similar to those described by the wording used in Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, but among them, one can single out a group of exceptions that have additional distinctive features, namely the so-called “strengthening provisions”, which were included in the documents to remove possible doubts about whether an exception should apply. The first known decision to provide a detailed analysis of such a “strengthened” national security exception is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes arbitral award in the dispute Angel Samuel Seda and others v Colombia. presented in this article, in which Colombia challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal, invoking the security exception contained in the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. This decision is of great interest, in particular with regard to the application of the good faith criterion by the tribunal in this dispute. It will be interesting to see how the practice of arbitration in relation to “enhanced” exceptions for security reasons will develop.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: REVIEW OF CASES INVOLVING FOREIGN INVESTORS’ CLAIMS AGAINST UZBEKISTAN
This article examines international investment arbitration cases against Uzbekistan. First, the article identifies a list of such cases, which is necessary because they all are confidential. Then, the author compares the outcomes of these cases with cases against other countries. The article also states the question what law did the arbitrators apply in resolving these cases: international treaties, national law, or contracts between foreign investors and Uzbekistan (or its state bodies or companies), and also, given the lack of a single body for resolving investment disputes, with which bodies do foreign investors file their claims against Uzbekistan. When faced with a claim from a foreign investor in international investment arbitration, Uzbekistan follows a specific strategy. In particular, it first attempts to challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and (or) the admissibility of the claim. To this end, Uzbekistan argues that the investment made by the foreigner is not an investment, and that the foreigner is not an investor protected by the applicable international treaty. Moreover, of great importance is the question of whether the claimant’s investment was lawfully sunk. If the claimants’ investments violated Uzbekistan’s law (for example, through corruption), such investments will not be protected by the international treaty. If this strategy of challenging the arbitrators’ jurisdiction and (or) the admissibility of the claim fails for Uzbekistan, an award on the merits of the case is likely to be rendered against it, Uzbekistan may prefer to enter into a settlement agreement with the claimant, may require the claimant to provide security for Uzbekistan’s arbitration costs, or may question why a third party (instead of the claimant) is funding the arbitration. In one case, Uzbekistan filed a counterclaim, but it was unsuccessful. An important issue is the attribution of internationally wrongful acts to Uzbekistan. If the arbitrators nevertheless rule against Uzbekistan on the merits of the dispute, it may request that the award be set aside or annulled. Finally, the article suggests that Uzbekistan has learned from its disputes with foreign investors, which can be seen in a new generation of its international treaties that significantly restrict investors’ rights.
SCRIPTORIUM
JUS CRIMINALE
ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW?
PART 2: THE PRINCIPLE OF NON BIS IN IDEM (“NO TRIAL TWICE FOR THE SAME OFFENCE”)
The institution of individual criminal liability is defined by a set of principles that shape and clarify its substance at both the national and international levels. Among the most significant are nullum crimen sine lege (“no crime without a law reference”), non bis in idem (“no trial twice for the same offence”), and nullum poena sine lege (“no punishment without law”). While these principles are undeniably important, their one-sided idealization has led some scholars to conclude that they hold identical meaning across all legal systems. On that basis, they are sometimes regarded as “general principles of law” within the meaning of Article 38(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. However, the way these principles are codified in the criminal laws of different states and in international law today does not fully support this view. This article focuses primarily on the principle of non bis in idem (“no trial twice for the same offence”), which prohibits holding a person criminally liable twice for the same offence. An analysis of doctrinal studies, along with national and international legal provisions that define the core elements of non bis in idem, leads to several conclusions. First, this principle has an unconditional character only within certain national legal systems. Second, when it comes to interaction between different national jurisdictions, the independence of legal systems and the inherent competition between the criminal laws of various states mean that individuals may still face multiple prosecutions for the same offence. Third, the judicial bodies of international criminal justice may, in cases expressly provided for in their founding statutes, convict individuals for the same conduct for which they had already been convicted. Since the general principles of law at the domestic, cross-border (interethnic) and international levels should coincide in their content, the article concludes that at this moment there are no grounds for attributing the principle of non bis in idem to the general principles of law (in the sense of the wording of Article 38(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice).
HISTORIA
THE WAY IT HAS HISTORICALLY DEVELOPED: THE SHIPPING REGIME IN THE WATERS OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AS AN EXAMPLE OF A LIMITED HISTORICAL RIGHT
This article is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of the legal regime governing navigation in the waters of the Northern Sea Route as a specific form of exercising the Russian Federation’s exclusive historical rights. Its main objective is to develop a concept that justifies Russia’s special rights in the Arctic based on the modern understanding of the nature and content of the institution of historical waters in international maritime law. To achieve this goal, the paper provides a critical analysis of the spatial and temporal limits of Article 234 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in the context of Arctic ice melt; assesses the gaps and contradictions that exist in domestic doctrine and legislation in the field of legal regulation of the status of historic waters; it systematizes current international approaches to the concept, classification, and qualification criteria for the consolidation of historical rights to maritime spaces, and assesses the compliance of the legal regime for navigation in the waters of the Northern Sea Route with these criteria. In writing this article, a comparative legal analysis was conducted of many works by well-known domestic and foreign authors on the subject, and a historical, legal, and systematic interpretation was made of the provisions of the most important relevant international and national legal acts, as well as relevant judicial practice. The key conclusion of the study is the hybrid nature of the legal regime of the Northern Sea Route. It is argued that it is based not only on the special environmental protection powers that Russia has under Article 234 of the 1982 Convention, but also on the special quasi-territorial historical rights to this maritime space that Russia has developed to date. The authors conclude that these rights fully meet the established criteria for their consolidation, as defined by modern scientific doctrine, international normative acts, and global judicial practice. At the same time, the key significance of Russia’s historical rights to use the waters of the Northern Sea Route lies in the fact that they constitute an independent and full-fledged legal basis for Russia to exercise its jurisdiction in the coastal Arctic waters.
OPINIO JURIS
CHINA’S POLITICS IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
China’s main legal positions regarding the law of the sea are set out in the 1958 Declaration on the Territorial Sea, the 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of China, and other legislation, white papers, government statements, and official documents. Other relevant sources include the Critical Study of the South China Sea Arbitration Awards prepared by the China Society of International Law and the Critical study of the South China Sea Awards prepared by the National Institute for South China Sea Studies. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) policy in the field of international law of the sea is characterized by an emphasis on historical rights that were not revoked by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as international customs that exist alongside the Convention. It also involves the PRC’s own interpretation of certain provisions of the Convention, an appeal to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, and an emphasis on regional and anti-colonial specifics. China persists in pursuing this policy using a diverse range of foreign policy documents and numerous acts of domestic law. This article examines China’s positions on titles to islands and other land formations, the international legal regime of islands (including the interpretation of Article 121 of the 1982 Convention and the concept of outer archipelagos of continental states), the delimitation of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves, the regime for navigation in territorial sea and exclusive economic zone, the regime for the Nine-Dash Line area, and the resolution of maritime law disputes. The PRC’s policy may influence some general concepts and contribute to the formation of a regional order (lex specialis). Disputes involving China highlight a general problem: the lack of clarity in the text of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, particularly with regard to the regime of the exclusive economic zone. Indeed, the Convention does not provide clear guidance for States regarding their obligation to “have due regard” to each other’s rights and duties and resolve conflicts “on the basis of equity” pursuant to Articles 56(2), 58(3), and 59.
JUS GENTIUM
INTERACTION BETWEEN LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE LEGAL ORDER OF THE NETHERLANDS: MONISTIC TRADITION AND EUROPEAN PROGRESS
The article substantiates the convergence of the application of the norms of public international law and the law of the European Union in the legal system of the Netherlands, for which the corresponding term is introduced. The term “extranational norms” is also introduced as a term covering international and supranational norms. New empirical evidence confirms the influence of George Scelle’s ideas, particularly the theory of role splitting, on the Dutch legal community. It is proved that the lawyers of the post-war Netherlands, both theorists and practitioners, have developed a unified approach for interaction with both legal systems. For the Dutch courts, this means applying a method of consistent interpretation, which has expanded the grounds for the application of international treaties by analogy with the directives of the European Union. For the legislative branch, it means basing its actions on the largely innovative provisions of the Constitution (1983). The article critically assesses the problem of the dichotomy of monism and dualism in public international law by considering the legal practice of the Netherlands. For the Dutch legal order, monism is a legal tradition that is maintained, among other things, because of the state’s desire to protect itself from powerful states. In many ways, this desire has led to tension with regard to interaction of the European law with other systems. The article uses classical methods of legal research: formal-logical method, comparative analysis, historical method, as well as the critical method (in the assessing of monism as an element of the worldview of Dutch lawyers). The author deliberately refuses to deconstruct the role of George Scelle in shaping the worldview of Dutch lawyers, since a generally accepted narrative on this issue did not have time to form. One of the reasons for the rethinking of monism is the reaction of the Dutch courts to their own analogue of the Kadi I case and the subsequent reflection of this case by researchers. The theory of legal pluralism, accepted in the science of international law, can equally be applied in the study of the interaction of three systems: domestic (Dutch), international, and European. Best known as explained by Armin von Bogdandy and Anne Peters, this theory has not received due attention among Dutch researchers.
ACADEMIA
CONVENTUS ACADEMICI
COURT-CENTREDNESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRO ET CONTRA (THE CONCEPT AND ITS ANALYTICAL POTENTIAL; BASED ON THE MATERIALS OF THE PH.D. STUDENTS’ SYMPOSIUM)
This article elaborates the court-centredness of international law as a framework for examining how the adjudicatory form (international courts, international adjudication, and judicial modes of reasoning) shapes the discipline’s sense of what counts as a persuasive legal argument and how such arguments are legitimised. Court-centredness is framed neither as a pro- or anti-court agenda nor merely as a quantitative proxy for tribunal proliferation. Instead, it is conceptualised as a multi-layered phenomenon: 1) theoretical and historical, where the image of a court sets horizons of normative imagination and competes with alternative vocabularies of international legal authority; 2) institutional, reflecting the normalisation of recourse to adjudication alongside the development of non-adversarial non-compliance mechanisms and procedures for follow-up on implementation; and 3) epistemic, concerned with how judicial language and formats shape disciplinary standards of argumentation, teaching, and knowledge production. Drawing on doctrinal analysis and a close reading of the symposium debate, the article clarifies the relationship between court-centredness and judicialisation and argues for distinguishing its manifestations across contexts. It also introduces an element of disciplinary self-reflection, highlighting which forms of argument are routinely treated as persuasive and legitimate and which infrastructures of compliance and implementation are more readily relegated to the background. The article’s empirical and polemical reference point is the Ph.D. students’ symposium “Court-centredness of international law: pro et contra” (17 May 2025, Saint Petersburg University), including the opening lecture by R.A.Kolodkin, Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Engaging with his claim that courts are only “one strand in a much larger picture” and do not determine international law in any final sense, the article uses this position as a methodological counterpoint to calibrate the concept. This approach resists treating adjudication as the system’s natural centre and instead situates judicial rationality alongside non-judicial infrastructures of implementation, domestic intermediaries shaping the effectiveness of decisions, and the plurality of international fora that generates coordination, competition, and strategic forum selection. The article thus demonstrates the heuristic value of a court-centred lens while also identifying its risks, ranging from the instrumentalisation of procedure and abuse of process to underplaying the institutional and jurisdictional complexity of the post-fragmentation landscape.